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1. Two Puzzles about Propositions
This article is about some puzzles involving propositional attitude reports.
The standard view of a sentence like
(1) Sally believes that Fido barks.
is that the verb believes expresses a relation between Sally and the prop-
osition that Fido barks. These relata are the referents of the subject Sally
and the complement clause that Fido barks. The same is true, mutatis mutan-
dis, for other verbs with that-clause complements.1
Consider, however, the following pair:
(2) a. Sally fears that Fido barks.
b. Sally fears the proposition that Fido barks.
The standard view says that, in (2a), the clause that Fido barks refers to the
proposition that Fido barks. On this view, (2a) is true just in case Sally
stands in the fears-relation to that proposition. But consider (2b). Surely
Many thanks to Kyle Blumberg, Kara Dreher, Cian Dorr, Harvey Lederman, Peter van
Elswyk, and Crispin Wright for helpful comments and discussion. I am especially grateful
to Ben Holguı´n and Jim Pryor for invaluable comments on several drafts, and (most of all)
to Stephen Schiffer for guidance and encouragement in early stages of this work.
1. A typographical note: I use italics to quote and mention object-language expres-
sions—except for full sentences, which I surround in quotation marks or indent as num-
bered examples—and when emphasizing or introducing a term. To avoid confusion, I do
not italicize when using foreign phrases.
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the proposition that Fido barks refers to the proposition that Fido barks.2 So
(2b) should be true just in case Sally stands in the fears-relation to that
proposition. But this truth condition is the very same one that the stan-
dard view assigns to (2a). And yet, clearly, (2a) and (2b) have different
truth conditions: Sally might fear dogs but not propositions; she might
fear propositions but not dogs.
This apparent problem for the standard view was first noticed by
Prior (1963, 1971), so I call it Prior’s puzzle. The problem is that the stan-
dard view appears to violate
Substitutivity Salva Veritate (Roughly): Coreferential expressions can be
substituted for one another while preserving truth value (in extensional
contexts).
If the clause that Fido barks refers to the proposition that Fido barks, then
we should (in suitable contexts) be able to replace this clause with any
coreferential expression salva veritate. In (2a), that Fido barks seems to
occur in an extensional context.3 And surely the proposition that Fido barks
refers to the proposition that Fido barks. So the standard view of prop-
ositional attitude reports seems to violate substitutivity salva veritate.
Consider next
(3) a. Sally hopes that Fido barks.
b. *Sally hopes the proposition that Fido barks.
Sentence (3b) is not even well-formed—hence the asterisk. Thus, the
standard view appears to violate
Substitutivity Salva Congruitate (Roughly): Coreferential expressions can
be substituted for one another while preserving grammaticality (in all con-
texts). (see, e.g., Wright 1998)
If that Fido barks refers to the proposition that Fido barks, then we should
(in any context) be able to replace this clause with any coreferential expres-
sion salva congruitate. And surely the proposition that Fido barks refers to the
2. I here ignore the possibility that definite descriptions are not referring expres-
sions—partly because (following King 2002) I suspect that the data would not be much
less puzzling if reframed in terms of some semantic function other than reference.
3. This assumption might be questioned. I simply take it for granted here, since it
seems to be common ground among those who discuss this puzzle. It is defended more
explicitly by Betti (2015, 133) on the grounds that substitutions like (2) are relevantly
unlike substitutions within clausal complements. Proponents of the standard view who
reject this assumption would owe us some account of why believes that p and believes the
proposition that p always mean the same thing.
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proposition that Fido barks. So (3) seems to show that the standard view
of propositional attitude reports violates substitutivity salva congruitate.
This problem for the standard view was first pressed by Rundle (1967), so
I call it Rundle’s puzzle.
Some philosophers believe that these substitution failures under-
mine—or, at least, provide strong evidence against—the standard view
of propositional attitude reports. Such philosophers conclude that prop-
ositional attitude reports do not report relations between agents and
propositions (Bach 1997; Moltmann 2003), that that-clauses often refer
to entities other than propositions (Parsons 1993; Moffett 2003; Harman
2003), or that that-clauses enjoy some nonreferential semantic relation to
what may or may not be propositions (Rosefeldt 2006; Pryor 2007).
I disagree.4 I argue that the substitution failures are consistent
with the standard view of propositional attitude reports. The substitution
failures are mere “grammatical scarecrows” (Geach 1972, 169): at best,
they reflect interesting quirks of natural languages, but they should not
scare us off an otherwise attractive philosophical view.
My strategy is, first, to reduce Rundle’s puzzle to Prior’s puzzle. I
argue that the proper substitution instance for a sentence like (3a) is not
(3b), but rather
(4) Sally hopes for the proposition that Fido barks.
I claim that the definite description in (4) complements the very same verb
that occurs in (3a)—the two-word lexeme hopes for—but that the prep-
osition for is suppressed in (3a) in accordance with the rules of English
grammar. However, although this substitution preserves grammatical-
ity, it results in a different meaning. So the requirement of substitutivity
salva congruitate is met in a way that seems to violate substitutivity salva
veritate. My solution to Rundle’s puzzle, therefore, requires a solution to
Prior’s puzzle. I conjecture that, in sentences like (4) and (2b), the prop-
osition that Fido barks does not in fact denote a proposition. It, therefore,
does not denote the same thing as the clause that Fido barks. It will take
some work to explain what it does denote. But the resulting account
allows us to solve Prior’s puzzle, Rundle’s puzzle, and some other puzzles
to be introduced.5
4. So do King (2002), Schiffer (2003), Boe¨r (2009), and Ku¨nne (2014).
5. Since I end up denying that the proposition that p denotes a proposition, my
response to Rundle’s puzzle may seem unnecessary. But my response to Rundle’s puzzle
helps motivate some key moves in solving Prior’s puzzle in sections 3 and 4.3. It is also of
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2. Rundle’s Puzzle
I motivate my solution to Rundle’s puzzle in section 2.1 by considering
a related puzzle involving adjective complementation, to which the solu-
tion seems to me more obvious. In section 2.2, I explain why and how
the requirement of substitutivity salva congruitate must be weakened to
allow for my solution to the puzzle about adjective complementation. In
section 2.3, I show how that solution can be naturally extended to solve
Rundle’s puzzle.
2.1. Adjective Complementation
My solution to Rundle’s puzzle begins with a different structure—adjec-
tive complementation—which has not been much discussed in the phil-
osophical literature on that-clauses.6 Consider the following sentences:
(5) a. Sally is afraid that Fido barks.
b. *Sally is afraid the proposition that Fido barks.
The complement clause in (5a) is not replaceable salva congruitate by
the proposition that Fido barks.7 Nor is it replaceable by any other proposi-
tion description—that is, any description of the form the F that p. Why not?
The reason is not, I think, that the clausal complements of adjec-
tives do not refer to propositions. There is a simpler answer. The simpler
answer appeals to the fact that proposition descriptions can complement
adjectives only when marked by a preposition—but not just any preposi-
tion will do:
(6) a. Sally is afraid of the proposition that Fido barks.
b. *Sally is afraid in/under/after/on the proposition that Fido
barks.
Our limited flexibility in choice of prepositions suggests that the defi-
nite description in (6a) denotes a prepositional argument of the relation
independent interest for those who reject my solution to Prior’s puzzle. And even if the
proposition that p does not denote a proposition, it is worth leaving open the possibility that
some noun phrase complement of some verb like hopes denotes a proposition; even this
weak possibility requires something like my solution to Rundle’s puzzle.
6. Ku¨nne (2003, 2014) mentions but does not discuss adjectives. He simply assumes
that they are relevantly like hopes. Betti (2015) uses a substitution failure involving happy
to argue that that-clauses are not singular terms.
7. Although I use afraid in all examples in this section, I also intend my claims to
apply to related adjectives, such as happy, sorry, confident, honest, and hopeful.
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expressed by afraid of.8 It is an argument, as opposed to the object of an
adjunct phrase. And it is a prepositional argument, as opposed to a direct
argument (e.g., the argument of a transitive verb). The following exam-
ples, based on Merlo and Ferrer 2006, illustrate the contrasts:
(7) a. Sally studies philosophy.
b. Sally is a student of philosophy.
c. Sally is a student from Florida.
In (7a), philosophy denotes an argument of the relation expressed by
studies. In (7b), philosophy denotes an argument of the relation expressed
by student of. The preposition in (7b) makes this argument prepositional
rather than direct. But philosophy is an argument in both cases, unlike
Florida in (7c), which is the object of an adjunct phrase. Intuitively, (7c)
does not mean that Sally bears the student-from relation to Florida; it
means that Sally is a student, and that she is from Florida. By contrast,
(7b) does not mean that Sally is a student, and that she is “of philosophy”;
it means that she studies philosophy.9 The interpretation of of philosophy
depends on its associated head student, whereas from Florida has a relatively
constant meaning (see Grimshaw 1992). Similarly, “Sally is afraid of dogs”
does not mean that Sally is afraid and also “of dogs.” The interpretation of
of dogs depends on the adjective afraid.
The distinction between arguments and adjuncts is somewhat slip-
pery; we need not put much weight on it here. The point is that afraid of
functions as a single lexical unit in (6a). (6a) is true just in case Sally
stands in the afraid-of relation to the referent of the proposition that Fido
barks. This reading of (6a) helps explain why (5b)—“Sally is afraid the
proposition that Fido barks”—is ill-formed, because it explains why the
preposition after afraid is necessary when the complement is a noun
phrase. But so what? (5a)—“Sally is afraid that Fido barks”—does not
say that Sally stands in the afraid-of relation to anything. It only contains
afraid, followed by a that-clause. Why think that my reading of (6a) tells us
anything about (5a)?
I claim that (5a) represents Sally as standing in the afraid-of rela-
tion to the referent of that Fido barks, just as (6a) represents Sally as stand-
8. Similar claims apply to happy (about), sorry ( for/about), confident (in/about), honest
(about), and hopeful (of/about). Deutscher (2000) uses oblique where I say prepositional. See
also Loukanova and Jime´nez-Lo´pez 2012.
9. Some might suggest that nominal complements of adjectives are adjuncts because
they are optional: “Sally is afraid” is fine. But although all adjuncts are optional, not all
arguments are obligatory.
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ing in this same relation to the referent of the proposition that Fido barks. But
the preposition is suppressed in (5a) due to a rule of English grammar:
namely, that prepositions cannot preface the complementizers that, for, or
to (Dixon 2005, 232). That is why (8) is ill-formed:
(8) *Sally is afraid of that Fido barks.
How do we know that this rule explains the absence of a preposition in
(5a)? Why not think instead that (8) is unacceptable simply because that
Fido barks cannot denote an argument of the afraid-of relation, contrary to
my reading of (5a)? I offer three reasons to favor my account.
First, we can rescue the preposition by stating Sally’s attitude in a
nonrestrictive relative clause:
(9) That Fido barks, which Sally was afraid of, was clear.
The relative clause in (9) seems to express a side remark that is true just in
case Sally was afraid that Fido barks (see Heim and Kratzer 1998, 64). And,
in (9), which seems to refer anaphorically to the referent of the subject
clause that Fido barks. This would seem hard to explain on the hypothesis
that that Fido barks cannot denote an argument of the afraid-of relation.
But it is exactly what we would expect if, as I have claimed, the clausal
complement in (5a) denotes the prepositional argument of the afraid-of
relation, but the preposition is omitted because it cannot precede the
complementizer that.
Second, prepositions can precede wh-complementizers. For
example,
(10) Sally was afraid of whether Fido barks.
The wh-clause complement of (10) denotes an argument of the afraid-of
relation in (10). This would seem hard to explain on the hypothesis that
that-clauses cannot denote arguments of this relation, because the wh-
clause in (10) and the that-clause in (5a) seem to play the same semantic
roles: they denote things that Sally is (reportedly) afraid of.
Third, the absence of a preposition between adjectives and their
that-clause complements is merely a quirk of certain natural languages. In
some other languages, a preposition may (in some cases, must) precede a
clausal complement wherever it would precede a noun phrase (Bozˇkovic´
1995, 49). For example, in Norwegian,
(11) a. Sally er [redd for ]/[skuffet over ]/[sikker pa˚ ]/[glad for ] at Fido
bjeffer.
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Sally is [afraid of ]/[disappointed about ]/[certain of ]/[happy
about ] that Fido barks.
b. Sally er [redd for ]/[skuffet over ]/[sikker pa˚ ]/[glad for ] Fido.
Sally is [afraid of ]/[disappointed about ]/[certain of ]/[happy
about ] Fido.
Since the grammatical rule I have cited is just a quirk of some natural
languages, my hypothesis would lead us to expect that declarative clausal
complements could denote overtly prepositional arguments in languages
without that rule. And that is just what we see in (11).10
We have seen three environments in which our hidden preposi-
tion reappears: nonrestrictive relative clauses, interrogative clauses, and
other languages. These considerations suggest that, in (5a)—“Sally is
afraid that Fido barks”—the preposition is absent only because English
forbids prepositions from preceding the complementizer that. This
makes it plausible that (5a) is true just in case Sally stands in the afraid-
of relation to the referent of that Fido barks, just as (6a)—“Sally is afraid of
the proposition that Fido barks”—is true just in case Sally stands in the
afraid-of relation to the referent of the proposition that Fido barks.
But how exactly does this help us solve Rundle’s puzzle? We still get
gibberish if we replace an adjective’s that-clause complement with a prop-
osition description and leave the other words in the sentence as they are.
Maybe I am right about why we get gibberish. But the requirement of
substitutivity salva congruitate, as I introduced it in section 1, does not
care about that. It lists no exceptions for the removal or addition of pre-
positions. To utilize my appeal to prepositional arguments in a solution to
Rundle’s puzzle, we must weaken or reinterpret the requirement of sub-
stitutivity salva congruitate. That is the task of section 2.2.
2.2. Revising Substitutivity Salva Congruitate
The principle of substitutivity salva congruitate is false, as I stated it in
section 1. That is why I qualified it with “roughly.”11 There is no reason to
suppose that coreferential expressions should be grammatically intersub-
stitutable in any context, in any natural language, with no manipulation
of the expressions’ surrounding environment. Consider, for example, the
10. Thanks to Knut Skarsaune for helpful discussion of these examples.
11. I qualified substitutivity salva veritate in the same way because preservation of
truth value requires preservation of grammaticality.
Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows
69
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/128/1/63/558946/63nebel.pdf
by NEW YORK UNIVERSITY user
on 20 January 2019
following substitution of a name for a first-person pronoun (see Oliver
2005):
(12) a. I am writing.
b. *Jake am writing.
Does (12) show that Jake cannot refer to the same person as the occur-
rence of I above? Of course not.12 The proper substitution of Jake for I
is not (12b), but rather, “Jake is writing.” The ill-formed substitution in
(12b) does not undermine the coreferentiality of I and Jake. It shows only
that we have to conjugate verbs.
That is just one example in which simple substitution of core-
ferential expressions fails to preserve grammaticality. Other examples
involve apposition (Schiffer 2003), premodifying adjectives (Oliver 2005),
and noun gender (Dolby 2009).
What do we learn from these apparent counterexamples to the
requirement of substitutivity salva congruitate? It would be hasty to con-
clude that there is nothing to the requirement and that Rundle’s puzzle is
in no way puzzling. It is more reasonable to conclude that the principle
should be revised, restricted, or reinterpreted in some way to accommo-
date the complexities of natural language. I do not know exactly how the
principle should be revised. But I submit that any plausible version of the
principle must allow for my response to the substitution failures involving
adjective complements.
Consider, for example, a revision suggested by Dolby (2009). Dolby
suggests that we revise the relevant notion of substitution. In (12), I sim-
ply replaced one expression with another without changing anything else
in the sentence. Call that copy-paste substitution. Copy-paste substitution is
not a proper test of coreference, because it yields false negatives, as in
(12): some coreferential terms cannot always be copy-paste substituted
for one another while preserving grammaticality. Dolby suggests instead
that a proper substitution instance should follow a two-step procedure.
First, we extentially generalize the sentence with respect to the initial
expression, making whatever changes are required by the grammatical
rules of the language. (12a), for example, would be existentially gener-
alized as, “Someone is writing.” Then we specify the generalization with
respect to the substitute expression, also making whatever changes gram-
mar requires. Thus, “Someone is writing” would be specified as “Jake is
12. Fancy views about first-person pronouns are irrelevant here, because the same
problem occurs for the intersubstitutability of I and me, and for he and him.
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writing,” which provides the intuitively correct test of whether I and Jake
corefer. Call this process Dolby substitution.
Dolby substitution cannot take us from a well-formed sentence to
an ill-formed one—we make whatever changes are needed to preserve
grammaticality along the way—so it may seem unable to provide a useful
test of coreference. But, Dolby suggests, it is not trivial whether any given
expression is, in some or any context, Dolby-intersubstitutable salva con-
gruitate with another. For there may be no grammatical rules to guide us
through one of the steps of existential generalization or specification. For
example, Dolby insists that there are no such rules for the substitution of
is a horse for the concept horse. If that is right, then Dolby substitution may
provide a nontrivial test of coreference while avoiding the standard coun-
terexamples to substitutivity salva congruitate.
Can we Dolby-substitute proposition descriptions for the that-clause
complements of adjectives? We can, if we help ourselves to my proposal in
section 2.1. We can existentially generalize (5a)—“Sally is afraid that Fido
barks”—with respect to that Fido barks, as follows:
(13) Sally is afraid of something.
The arguments of section 2.1 make it plausible that (13) is a legitimate
way of existentially generalizing (5a). And this generalization can be spec-
ified as (6a): “Sally is afraid of the proposition that Fido barks.” That
is how we Dolby-substitute proposition descriptions for the that-clause
complements of adjectives.
I have some reservations about the notion of Dolby substitution.13
I doubt it handles all possible counterexamples to the simple require-
ment of substitutivity salva congruitate.14 Unfortunately, I do not know of
a better alternative in the literature. I am not confident that there is an
informative, extensionally adequate universal generalization to be found
13. Trueman (2012) claims that Dolby’s proposal is viciously circular because it pre-
supposes that we know which substitutions are grammatical. Some kind of circularity along
these lines seems to me inevitable, as Trueman (2018) later seems to admit.
14. Some verbs can only be followed by reflexive pronouns (Dixon 2005, 64). Con-
sider “The mayor prided herself on the performance.” The following substitution
instance (where Sally is the mayor) is ungrammatical: “The mayor prided Sally on the
performance.” But herself and Sally should refer to the same person. It is hard to see how
Dolby substitution can secure that result: “The mayor prided someone on the perfor-
mance” is ungrammatical. (The problem is not just that reflexive pronouns function as
bound variables, because we can Dolby-substitute Sally for herself in “The mayor hit her-
self.”)
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in the vicinity of substitutivity salva congruitate—nor do I feel particularly
responsible for discovering it if there is one. But any plausible version of
the requirement should, like Dolby’s, allow us to mark a prepositional
argument with a preposition when substituting a noun phrase (which
requires the preposition) for a that-clause (which forbids the preposi-
tion)—just as it would have to allow for other rule-governed manipula-
tions of context (e.g., conjugating verbs). I cannot prove this. But I think
it is suggested by the following vague, but plausible, generic generaliza-
tion: coreferential expressions can typically be copy-paste substituted for
one another while preserving grammaticality; when they cannot be, it is
because of some identifiable quirk of the language, and we should expect
some simple, principled manipulation of context to provide a well-
formed substitution. I have shown that to be true of the substitution fail-
ures involving adjective complements. In the next section, I extend my
account to verbs like hopes in an effort to solve Rundle’s puzzle.
2.3. Resolving Rundle’s Puzzle
I have argued that the proper substitution instance for a sentence like
(5a)—“Sally is afraid that Fido barks”—is not (5b)—“Sally is afraid the
proposition that Fido barks”—but rather (6a)—“Sally is afraid of the
proposition that Fido barks.” I suggested that this manipulation is legiti-
mate because the preposition is omitted in (5a) only due to a quirk of
English, which prohibits prepositions from preceding the complemen-
tizer that.
How can this account help us solve Rundle’s puzzle? Recall (3):
a. Sally hopes that Fido barks.
b. *Sally hopes the proposition that Fido barks.
Why is (3b) ungrammatical? The answer is that noun phrases can com-
plement hopes (and its ilk, including wishes, cares, complains, brags, insists,
rejoices, and agrees) only when following a preposition—but not just any
preposition will do:15
15. The corresponding forms for the other verbs in this category are wishes ( for), cares
(about), complains (about), brags (about), insists (on), rejoices (in), and agrees (on). Some other
verbs that might seem to be like hopes in resisting complementation by proposition
descriptions should be treated separately: dreams, thinks, reminds, decides, persuades, warns,
informs, boasts, and says. These verbs still require prepositions when followed by most noun
phrases, with seemingly principled exceptions (Dixon 2005). Dreams and thinks can be
followed by quantifiers (e.g., something) and cognate noun phrases—for example, dreamed
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(14) a. Sally hopes for the proposition that Fido barks.
b. *Sally hopes in/on/through the proposition that Fido barks.
Our limited choice of prepositions with which to follow hopes suggests
that, in (14a), the referent of the proposition that Fido barks is a prepositional
argument of the relation expressed by the two-word lexeme hopes for, as
opposed to the object of an adjunct phrase (see Dixon 2005). This dis-
tinguishes hopes from, say, arrives: you can arrive at noon, after work,
before dark, by train, or in a car. This difference can be observed by con-
sidering transformations to the passive voice:
(15) a. *The holiday was arrived before by Sally.
16
b. The holiday was hoped for by Sally.
Sentence (15a) seems unacceptable, or at least less acceptable than (15b),
because “Sally arrived before the holiday” does not mean that Sally
stood in some arrived-before relation to the holiday. The prepositional
phrase before the holiday is an adjunct. (15b), by contrast, seems acceptable
because “Sally hoped for the holiday” means that Sally stood in the hoped-
for relation to the holiday.
I claim that (3a)—“Sally hopes that Fido barks”—is true just in
case Sally stands in the hopes-for relation to the referent of that Fido barks.
But the preposition is omitted because English does not allow preposi-
tions to precede the complementizer that.
Why think this reading of (3a) is correct? Why not think instead
that that-clauses simply cannot denote the arguments of hopes for, and that
they therefore cannot refer to the same things as proposition descrip-
tions? The main reason is that my interpretation is a natural extension of
a dream and thinking happy thoughts—but other noun phrases must be introduced by a
preposition (e.g., of, about, or up ). Reminds, persuades, warns, and informs can be followed by
noun phrases that refer to an agent; there remains an argument place for what the agent is
reminded, persuaded, warned, or informed of or about. Boasts seems ambiguous: you can
boast something (i.e., by having it as a feature) without boasting of or about it. The most
interesting case is says. You can say quite a lot of things: words, phrases, sentences, state-
ments, prayers, things, stuff, numbers, names, thoughts, and lines. And although says can
be followed by a small number of prepositions (e.g., of or about), there remains an argu-
ment place for a that-clause. So it differs greatly from the other verbs discussed in this
section. For that reason, I am inclined to think that “Sally said the proposition that Fido
barks” is grammatical but false. But I agree that says is a difficult case and that much more
can be said about this verb.
16. See Takami 1992 for discussion of many similar examples.
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what we observed about adjective complementation in section 2.1. But I
offer two more reasons.
First, the preposition is mandatory if we transform (3a) to the pas-
sive voice:
(16) That Fido barks is hoped for by Sally.
Clearly, however, (16) and (3a) share the same truth condition. This makes
it highly plausible that, in (3a), that Fido barks denotes the argument of the
hopes-for relation, even though no preposition is voiced in (3a).
Second, I mentioned in section 2.1 (see (10)) that prepositions
can precede wh-complementizers. Unfortunately, hopes for does not take
interrogative clause complements. But we can consider another verb that
is otherwise relevantly like hopes:
(17) a. Sally cares that Fido barks.
b. *Sally cares the proposition that Fido barks.
c. Sally cares about the proposition that Fido barks.
d. Sally cares about whether/why Fido barks.
Cares is relevantly like hopes, as (17a)–(17c) show. In (17c), the proposition
that Fido barks denotes the prepositional argument of cares about. And the
corresponding preposition reappears in (17d), when its complement is
an interrogative clause. This strongly suggests that the preposition is omit-
ted in (17a) only because English does not allow prepositions to precede
the complementizer that. And it would be surprising if this were true of
cares but not of hopes and other relevantly similar verbs.
I have given two reasons to think that (3a)—“Sally hopes that Fido
barks”—represents Sally as standing in the hopes-for relation to the refer-
ent of that Fido barks. Even if these reasons are not decisive, the obvious
similarity to the structure of adjective complementation makes it hard to
resist this reading of (3a). How does this help us solve Rundle’s puzzle?
I argued in section 2.2 that substitutivity salva congruitate must be
understood in a way that allows for certain manipulations of the sur-
rounding context. For example, the proper substitution of Jake for I in
“I am writing” is “Jake is writing.” If I am right that it is legitimate to add a
preposition when substituting proposition descriptions for the clausal
complements of adjectives, then it is hard to deny that (14a)—“Sally
hopes for the proposition that Fido barks”—should be the proper sub-
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stitution instance of (3a).17 To see this, let us apply Dolby’s substitution
test sketched in section 2.2. We existentially generalize (3a) as
(18) Sally hopes for something.
That (18) is the correct way to existentially generalize (3a) is made plau-
sible by the data I have presented in this section.18 And we get (14a) by
specifying this generalization with respect to the proposition that Fido barks.
Even if we have reservations about Dolby substitution in particular,
it is clear that my suggested manipulation should be kosher on any plau-
sible requirement of substitutivity salva congruitate. For we can explain
the ungrammaticality of (3b)—“Sally hopes the proposition that Fido
barks”—in a simple, principled way without denying that that-clauses
refer to propositions.
Of course, there is still a puzzle, because (3a) and (14a) have dif-
ferent truth conditions. But that is an apparent violation of substitutivity
salva veritate, not of substitutivity salva congruitate. It is no longer puz-
zling that replacing a that-clause complement of hopes with a noun phrase
fails to preserve grammaticality. We would not expect that substitution to
preserve grammaticality, even on the assumption that that-clauses refer to
propositions, because the substitution of a noun phrase for the clausal
complement of hopes requires us to reintroduce a preposition (in some-
thing like the way in which the substitution of coreferential nouns and
pronouns requires us to conjugate verbs). Thus, we have reduced Run-
dle’s puzzle to Prior’s puzzle in the following sense: if we can solve Prior’s
puzzle—if we can explain why sentences like (3a) and (14a) have differ-
ent truth conditions in a way that is consistent with the standard view of
propositional attitude reports—then there is no further apparent viola-
tion of substitutivity salva congruitate to be explained. This result will
help us make progress on Prior’s puzzle, as we will see in section 3.
17. Of course, when I call (14a) the proper substitution instance of (3a), I do not mean
that they have the same truth conditions. I just mean that the ungrammaticality of (3b)
does not demonstrate a violation of substitutivity salva congruitate, properly understood,
and that if (14a) were ungrammatical, then there would be a violation substitutivity salva
congruitate.
18. King (2002, 364) and Moltmann (2013, 127) find sentences like “Sally hopes
something” acceptable. I do not.
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3. The Proliferation of Polysemy
To solve Prior’s puzzle in a way that is consistent with the standard view of
propositional attitude reports we need to explain why sentences like
(2a)—“Sally fears that Fido barks”—and (2b)—“Sally fears the prop-
osition that Fido barks”—have different truth conditions even though
that-clauses refer to propositions.
King (2002) offers a simple explanation: fears is ambiguous (or
polysemous). Its meaning depends on the syntactic category of its com-
plement: it expresses one relation in (2a) and another in (2b). More gen-
erally, on King’s view, each verb that gives rise to Prior’s puzzle expresses
one relation when complemented by a that-clause and another relation
when complemented by a noun phrase.19 This claim would, if true, solve
Prior’s puzzle in a way that allows that-clauses and proposition descrip-
tions to refer to the same things.
We are now in a position to see, however, that a full solution to
Prior’s puzzle must also apply to a wider range of substitution failures,
such as (19) and (20):
(19) a. Sally is afraid/happy/sorry/confident/honest/hopeful that
Fido barks.
b. Sally is [afraid of ]/[happy about]/[sorry about/for]/[confi-
dent in/about]/[honest about]/[hopeful of/about] the prop-
osition that Fido barks.
(20) a. Sally hopes/wishes/cares/complains/brags/insists/rejoices/
agrees that Fido barks.
b. Sally [hopes for]/[wishes for]/[cares about]/[complains
about]/[brags about]/[insists on]/[rejoices in]/[agrees on]
the proposition that Fido barks.
To solve Prior’s puzzle, King’s proposal would have to extend to adjectives
and verbs with prepositional arguments. If it cannot plausibly extend to
those other expressions, then we should reject it in favor of a more com-
plete solution (if there is one). For it would be incredible if the (a)- and
(b)-sentences in (2), (19), and (20) had different truth conditions for
entirely different reasons. The problem seems to be the same in all three
cases.
19. King claims that believes and other verbs that do not give rise to Prior’s puzzle are
not ambiguous along this dimension. Also, King (2007, chap. 4) remains open to the pos-
sibility that some that-clauses designate nonpropositional entities such as facts.
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But adjectives like afraid and verbs like hopes are not plausibly
ambiguous in the way that King’s solution (if extended) would require.
I will start with verbs. Consider the following sentences uttered (or typed)
in the wild:
(21) Others hoped for a quick and painless death, and that they would be
able to remain in their own home to that point. (Healthtalk Australia
2016)
(22) The MMs only care about themselves and that they can buy shares at
a lower price, to sell to retail investors like us later at higher prices.
(FastMny [pseud.] 2017)
(23) I complained about the broken AC and that they did not even have
breakfast. . . . (Balou18 [pseud.] 2010)
(24) The mothers of two children (patients five and six) insisted on
operations and that they be simultaneous. (Klemens, Mhoon, and
Redleaf 2007, 1042)
I have bolded the complements of each verb to highlight the fact that a
single occurrence of each verb takes both noun phrase and that-clause
complements. If verbs with prepositional arguments were ambiguous in
the way required by an extension of King’s proposal, then we would expect
(21)–(24) to sound bad—more specifically, zeugmatic. By way of contrast,
consider
(25) a. Sally called my bluff.
b. Sally called her grandmother.
c. ?Sally called my bluff and her grandmother.
Called is ambiguous. It has one sense in (25a) and another in (25b). That
is why (25c) is infelicitous, except perhaps as a joke: the single use of called
cannot express both the relation in which Sally might stand to my bluff
and the relation in which she might stand to her grandmother. The
strangeness of (25c) is what I am calling zeugma. But (21)–(24) are not
zeugmatic. They are not jokes. Nor are they products of contrived phi-
losopher-speak. They are sincere, easily interpretable utterances by ordi-
nary speakers of what may be literal truths. This strongly suggests that
verbs like hope, care, complain, and insist are not ambiguous in the way that
King’s solution (if extended) would require.
We observe a similar effect with adjectives:
(26) The Soviet authorities are genuinely afraid of a religious revival and
that the “contagion” of religion will spread. ( J. Ellis 1980, 100)
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(27) To be certain of consistency within analysis and that similar views
were held regarding the interpretation of data and the formation
of themes, each researcher initially focused on the analysis of one
theme. (Gott et al. 2004, 530)
(28) They are sorry for the wasted years and that police records have
closed many doors to possible careers. (Bahna and Gordon 1978,
654)
The acceptability of these examples as nonjoke utterances makes it implau-
sible that adjectives like afraid, certain, and sorry are ambiguous in the
requisite way.
It would not be promising to respond to this evidence by refusing
to extend King’s proposal beyond verbs like fears. For even if we could
develop some other solution to the substitution failures in (19) and (20),
there is similar evidence against the ambiguity of fears:
(29) They fear the pregnancy and that it will destroy their well-arranged
lives. (Interviewee quoted in Mishtal 2009, 173)
(30) I love the quietness of L.A. and that you can just keep your head
down and work. ( Jennifer Meyer quoted in Felder 2017)
(31) But I still liked the idea of David and that he existed. (B. E. Ellis
2015)
(32) The initial recruitment letter for the experiment explained the
purpose and that it was being conducted by Copenhagen Business
School. (Harrison, Lau, and Yoo 2014, 9)
These examples count against King’s proposed ambiguity even if we do
not try to extend it to verbs like hopes or adjectives like afraid. And I do not
see how the proposal could be revised to predict ambiguity in Prior’s
puzzle but not in the examples above.
These examples may not be decisive—for example, because cer-
tain kinds of polysemy have been claimed not to elicit zeugma in certain
contexts.20 I do not know of a foolproof test of monosemy. But the data
above should, at the very least, adjust the burden of proof. Absent strong
evidence to the contrary, we should presume that our verbs and adjectives
of propositional attitude are not ambiguous between senses that take
clausal complements and senses that take noun phrase complements
(even if they are in other ways ambiguous, polysemous, or context-sensi-
tive). If we can solve Prior’s puzzle in some other way, then we should
20. See, e.g., Asher 2011. Felappi (2015) argues that the zeugma test is not sufficiently
reliable to show whether or not propositional attitude verbs are ambiguous.
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reject King’s proposed ambiguity because it multiplies senses beyond
necessity.21
The arguments of this section illustrate how my solution to Run-
dle’s puzzle is of importance to Prior’s puzzle. By reducing Rundle’s
puzzle to Prior’s puzzle, we have decreased the number of puzzle-types
to be solved. This makes our task in one way easier. But Prior’s puzzle is
now seen to be tokened by many other expressions: all those that gave rise
to Rundle’s puzzle, which we saw to include many adjectives in addition to
verbs. This makes our task in another way harder, because we now need a
solution to Prior’s puzzle that extends to these new expressions. King’s
solution seems not to fit the bill. I present an alternative solution to
Prior’s puzzle in the next two sections.
4. Concealed Questions
My solution to Prior’s puzzle is best motivated by considering another
putative substitution failure. Consider the following sentences:
(33) a. The teacher explained the cause of World War I.
b. The teacher explained the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
c. The cause of World War I was the assassination of Franz Ferdi-
nand.
(34) a. The number of insect species on Earth is astonishing.
b. 5.5 million is astonishing.
c. The number of insect species on Earth is 5.5 million.
21. It might be argued that King has provided strong evidence to the contrary. For
example, King observes that gapping constructions like, “Sally fears that it will rain, and
John the proposition that it will snow,” sound bad, which seems hard to explain on the
hypothesis that fears is univocal. I do not have a simple explanation of this data. But the
data seems to me more complicated than King suggests. Some gapping constructions
along these lines seem relatively acceptable—e.g., “Sally fears that it will rain, and John
the possibility that it will snow.” And analogous sentences involving believes—e.g., “Sally
believes that it will rain, and John the proposition that it will snow”—do not strike me as
obviously acceptable, even though believes is univocal on King’s view. Analogous pseudo-
gapping constructions involving believes—e.g., “Sally believes that it will rain as strongly as
John does the proposition that it will snow”—sound even worse. These complications
lead me to suspect that the sentences in question sound bad because they violate inde-
pendent constraints on gapping (and pseudogapping), not because their verbs are poly-
semous. For example, Jackendoff (1971) suggests that gapping is unacceptable (or at least
difficult) when multiple unlike constituents follow the deleted verb, including a noun
phrase followed by a that-clause.
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Why do the (a)- and (b)-sentences above have different truth conditions,
if the (c)-sentences are true? Plausibly, it is because the definite descrip-
tions the cause of World War I, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and the
number of insect species on Earth do not refer to the thing that caused World
War I, the event of Ferdinand’s assassination, and the number 5.5 million
in (33a), (33b), and (34a), respectively. Instead, they serve as concealed
questions (Baker 1968; see also Heim 1979, Nathan 2006, Romero 2006,
Aloni 2008, Aloni and Roelofsen 2012, Percus 2014, and Barker 2016).
(33a), for example, can be naturally paraphrased as, “The teacher
explained what caused World War I.” (34a) can naturally be paraphrased
as, “It is astonishing how many insect species there are on Earth.” And
these interrogative clauses—what caused World War I and how many insect
species there are on Earth—do not refer to assassinations or numbers.
What, then, are the semantic values of the definite descriptions in
(33) and (34)? That is a controversial issue, which I say more about in
section 5.2. For now, the important point is merely that the arguments of
explained and is astonishing in these sentences are not causes, assassina-
tions, or numbers. They are the kinds of things expressed by concealed
questions, whatever those are.
I have just given some examples of concealed questions. I will now
argue that, in some cases, the proposition that p does not refer to the prop-
osition that p, but serves instead as a concealed question. This will help us
solve some instances of Prior’s puzzle. This partial solution will lead the
way to a more general solution in section 5.
4.1. Application to Prior’s Puzzle
My proposal in this section only works for certain verbs—namely, those
that take wh- clause complements. These include explains, knows, under-
stands, guesses, reveals, finds out, and cares about (among others). I focus on
explains, but I take my proposal to apply to the other verbs in this category,
too.22 Although the proposal does not solve all instances of Prior’s puzzle,
it suggests a natural generalization, which I explore in section 5.
22. It is controversial whether knows, like the others in this group, gives rise to Prior’s
puzzle, or whether it is more like believes despite taking interrogative complements. I am
inclined to agree with Harman (2003) that knows does give rise to Prior’s puzzle: its that-
clause complements are not intersubstitutable salva veritate with proposition descrip-
tions. I suspect that intuitions to the contrary are driven by distinctively philosophical
patterns of use.
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Consider the following instance of Prior’s puzzle:
(35) a. Sally explained that Fido barks.
b. Sally explained the proposition that Fido barks.
These two sentences have different truth conditions. How can this be
explained on the standard view of propositional attitude reports? I sug-
gest that, in (35b), the proposition that Fido barks does not denote the prop-
osition that Fido barks—that is, the referent of that Fido barks—but rather
serves as a concealed question.23 What question does it conceal? I will get
to that in a few paragraphs. For now, I just want to argue that it conceals
some question or other.
My main reason for reading the proposition that Fido barks as a con-
cealed question in (35b) is that verbs like explains only take noun phrase
complements when those complements serve as concealed questions.
Thus, (36a) is acceptable; (36b) is not:
(36) a. Sally explained the cause of World War I.
b. *Sally explained the brick.
The cause of World War I conceals a question in (36a), which can be para-
phrased as what caused World War I. So we know that explain can embed
concealed questions. However, it does not take just any noun phrase
complement—witness (36b). (36b) is unacceptable—or, at least, very
hard to interpret—because the brick does not naturally serve as a con-
cealed question (for reasons I discuss in section 4.4). (36b) can seem
barely acceptable in certain contexts, when there is a salient question
under discussion about some brick. If you found a brick on your desk
and Sally explained why it was there, you might utter (36b). But when
there is no salient question for the brick to conceal, (36b) is unacceptable
for that reason.
More generally, verbs like explains take noun phrase complements
when and only when those complements conceal questions.24 And we
know from (35b) that the proposition that Fido barks can complement such
verbs. So it must serve as a concealed question. On this reading of (35b),
the proposition that Fido barks does not denote the proposition that Fido
23. A similar suggestion is made by Uegaki (2016) in response to other data.
24. At least in the relevant senses of those verbs. I am open to the possibility that some
verbs of propositional attitude are ambiguous or polysemous in certain ways—just not
that they are systematically ambiguous or polysemous in the sweeping way discussed in
section 3.
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barks—that is, the referent of that Fido barks—so it need not be intersub-
stitutable salva veritate with that Fido barks, just as the number of insect species
on Earth does not denote the number 5.5 million and thus need not be
intersubstitutable with 5.5 million in (34). This reading lets us solve the
relevant instances of Prior’s puzzle while maintaining that that-clauses
refer to propositions.
This reading of (35b) naturally invites us to ask, what question
does the proposition that Fido barks conceal? The answer is not obvious to
me. For some verbs—for example, explains, understands, and knows—the
complement seems to conceal a question like what the proposition that Fido
barks is/means/involves. But I admit that such a paraphrase is not obvi-
ous, and that the complements of other verbs—for example, guesses and
reveals—are even less readily paraphrased in that way. However, this non-
obviousness strikes me as a virtue, not a vice, of my proposal. Sentences
like (35b) are strange. It is not clear what it means to explain, know,
understand, guess, or reveal a proposition. This is not just because prop-
osition has both a technical and a nontechnical sense. For we can obtain
similar sentences that are similarly hard to interpret involving nontech-
nical terms like thought and rumor. The difficulty of interpreting these
sentences is, I think, explained by the hypothesis that the proposition that
Fido barks serves as a concealed question, along with the fact that no
particular question is salient in the context. If we supply such a ques-
tion—for example, by supposing that Sally is a contestant (or host) on
a game show and has to guess (or reveal) which proposition is the content
of some person’s attitude, or what proposition (in the nontechnical sense
of proposition) someone has offered—then the sentence may become
easier to interpret. So we should not reject the concealed question read-
ing simply on the grounds that it is not always obvious which question is
concealed. For we should not expect strange sentences like (35b) to have
obvious, straightforward meanings.
I have suggested that in (35b) the proposition that Fido barks serves as
a concealed question—even if it is not obvious what question it con-
ceals—on the grounds that verbs like explains take noun phrase com-
plements only when they conceal questions. I highlight two other virtues
of this proposal in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2. Belief Reports
Any solution to Prior’s puzzle must explain why the puzzle does not arise
for believes (and certain other verbs, such as assumes, asserts, grants, and
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denies)—that is, why “Sally believes that Fido barks” and “Sally believes the
proposition that Fido barks” have the same truth conditions. Appealing
to concealed questions goes some way toward such an account, because
believes does not take interrogative clause complements:
(37) *Sally believes whether/what/where/how/why/when Fido barks.
25
This is important because verbs that do not take interrogative clause com-
plements cannot be complemented by concealed questions (Baker 1968).
Thus, (38) is unacceptable (or at least very difficult to interpret):
(38) *Sally believes the cause of World War I.
Since believes does not take concealed question complements, we would
not expect the proposition that Fido barks to serve as a concealed question in
the sentence, “Sally believes the proposition that Fido barks.” And it does
not. The absence of a concealed question reading for believes thus helps
explain why believes does not give rise to Prior’s puzzle. This provides some
evidence that at least some instances of Prior’s puzzle are explained by
concealed question readings of proposition descriptions.
4.3. Ku¨nne’s Puzzle
My appeal to concealed questions also offers a simple solution to a related
puzzle, which we have not yet discussed. Ku¨nne (2003, 2014) points out
that, in certain cases, proposition descriptions cannot grammatically be
replaced by that-clauses:
(39) a. Sally and Fred debated the proposition that Fido barks.
b. *Sally and Fred debated that Fido barks.
Rundle’s puzzle involved verbs that seemed to take that-clause comple-
ments but not noun phrase complements. Ku¨nne’s puzzle, by contrast,
involves verbs that take noun phrase complements but not that-clause
complements. (This category includes entertains, describes, and analyzes,
to which my claims below also apply.)
My solution to Rundle’s puzzle does not apply to Ku¨nne’s puzzle,
because there is no preposition in (39a) to mark a prepositional argu-
25. We can say, “Sally believes what you said,” but that is a free relative clause, which is
distinct from interrogative clauses in several important ways. One simple morphological
test is whether the wh-word can be suffixed by -ever: if so, then it is a free relative pronoun,
not an interrogative complementizer (Bresnan and Grimshaw 1978).
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ment. But my appeal to concealed questions does apply, because debates
takes interrogative clause complements:
(40) Sally and Fred debated whether/why Fido barks.
We should therefore expect debates to embed concealed questions—
which it does:
(41) Sally and Fred debated the cause of World War I.
And, like explains, debates resists noun phrase complements that do not
readily conceal questions:
(42) *Sally and Fred debated the brick.
Sentence (42) is unacceptable, or at least very hard to interpret (except
perhaps in contexts where some particular question about the brick is
salient).
These considerations suggest that the proposition that Fido barks
serves as a concealed question in (39a). It does not refer to the prop-
osition that Fido barks.26 Thus the proposition that Fido barks (when it
complements debates and its ilk) need not be intersubstitutable salva con-
gruitate with that Fido barks. This solution to Ku¨nne’s puzzle is, I think, a
significant advantage of my appeal to concealed questions.
4.4. Sortal Nouns vs. Relational Nouns
I have suggested that proposition descriptions sometimes conceal ques-
tions. I motivated this suggestion, in part, by contrasting the acceptability
of proposition descriptions with the unacceptability of the brick as the
complements of question-embedding verbs. I now consider an objection
to my proposal. The objection is that proposition descriptions are not the
kinds of noun phrases that can conceal questions: they are more like the
brick than like the cause of World War I.
Why is the brick unable to conceal a question (in normal contexts)?
Barker (2016) suggests the following answer, following Lo¨bner (1981)
and Nathan (2006): it is because brick is a sortal noun. Sortal nouns are
26. It might seem surprising that, on my view, debates does not express a relation
to propositions. But, in an indirect sense, it does. On the view sketched in section 5.2,
questions denote functions whose values are propositions. Thus, for example, to debate
whether Fido barks is, indirectly, to bear a certain relation to the propositions that Fido
barks and that Fido does not bark, via the question to which these propositions are the possible
answers.
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supposed to be nouns that express properties of individuals—unlike
relational nouns, which express two-place relations between individuals.
For example, whereas day is a sortal noun, birthday is a relational noun:
any birthday is the birthday of someone—not so for day. Whereas animal
is a sortal noun, pet is a relational noun: any pet is someone’s—not so for
animal. The distinction between sortal and relational nouns is slippery.
But, however we carve out that distinction, proposition might appear to be
a paradigm case of a sortal noun (see Partee and Borschev 2012). Prop-
ositions are not things possessed by or otherwise related to people or
other individuals. If proposition is a sortal noun, then proposition descrip-
tions might seem unable to conceal questions, contrary to my proposal
here.
It is not clear to me that proposition is a sortal noun. If propositions
are (say) functions from possible worlds to truth values, then proposition
would seem to count as a relational noun. But even if we grant that prop-
osition is a sortal noun, sortal nouns can head concealed questions when
modified in certain ways. Here are some examples due to Barker (2016):
(43) a. *Sally found out the animal.
b. Sally found out Fred’s favorite animal.
(44) a. *Sally found out the street.
b. Sally found out the street that the restaurant is located on.
The (a)-sentences above suggest that sortal nouns do not readily lend
themselves to interpretation as concealed questions. But the (b)-sen-
tences show that such nouns can serve as concealed questions when mod-
ified by favorite or certain relative clauses. (43b) can be paraphrased as,
“Sally found out what Fred’s favorite animal is.” (44b) can be paraphrased
as, “Sally found out which street the restaurant is located on.”
Why is it important that sortal nouns can conceal questions when
modified in these ways? It is important because even if proposition is a sortal
noun, the proposition that Fido barks may be modified in a way that makes it
suitable to conceal a question.27 Some people hold that that Fido barks
functions as a relative clause in the proposition that Fido barks (Kayne 2009;
Arsenijevic´ 2009; Haegeman 2012). This would make proposition descrip-
tions relevantly analogous to the definite description in (44b). Others
hold that that Fido barks is an adjunct that modifies the proposition (Cuba
27. See Lo¨bner (1985, 299), who lists “an abstract sortal head noun and a subordinate
clause which explicitly specifies a certain abstract entity of the sort indicated” as a kind of
“functional concept.”
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2017). Even on that kind of view, the proposition that Fido barks would seem
to be a suitable concealed question, because other postnominal modi-
fiers seem to allow sortal nouns to conceal questions (Nathan 2006,
118)—as in
(45) Sally found out the person responsible.
The person responsible can be paraphrased as which person was responsible. If,
more generally, postnominal modifiers can turn sortal nouns into con-
cealed questions, then proposition descriptions can conceal questions
even on the view that that Fido barks (as it occurs in the proposition that Fido
barks) is a modifying adjunct rather than a relative clause.
I have suggested that, on at least two different views about the
function of that-clauses in proposition descriptions, such descriptions can
serve as concealed questions even if their head nouns are sortal. But we
have also seen more direct evidence that proposition descriptions can
conceal questions: if they could not conceal questions, then (like the brick)
they would not so readily complement verbs like explains and debates. Even
if the evidence presented so far is not decisive, we will encounter an addi-
tional reason to admit proposition descriptions as concealed questions
in section 5.28
4.5. Summary
I have suggested that the proposition that p sometimes conceals a question,
rather than referring to the proposition denoted by that p. This explains
why, in certain contexts, the proposition that p need not be intersubstituta-
ble salva veritate or salva congruitate with that p. And it also helps explain
why Prior’s puzzle does not arise for certain verbs. But the account does
not provide a complete solution to Prior’s puzzle, because some predi-
cates that give rise to Prior’s puzzle do not take interrogative clause comp-
lements. This is true of fears and hopes ( for). In section 5, I sketch a more
28. Another objection to my appeal to concealed questions is that it cannot explain
why substitutions of proper names (e.g., logicism) or indefinite descriptions (e.g., a prop-
osition) for that-clauses do not preserve truth value. But both names and indefinites can
conceal questions. Barker (2016) gives an example for names: if Sally is asked to match the
names of world leaders with the names of the countries they led, we might say, “Sally only
knew Obama,” to mean that Sally only knew the country led by Obama (i.e., which country
Obama led). Frana (2006) argues that sentences like, “John knows a doctor that can treat
your illness,” have concealed-question readings (in addition to acquaintance readings). I
give a more general treatment of these variants in section 5.1.
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general solution to Prior’s puzzle that is motivated by my appeal to con-
cealed questions.
5. Propositional Concepts
The original version of Prior’s puzzle with which I began this article
involved the predicate fears: when Sally fears that Fido barks, she need
not fear the proposition that Fido barks. In section 2, we saw that this same
puzzle afflicts adjectives like afraid (of ) and verbs like hopes ( for). We can-
not completely solve the puzzle by appealing to concealed questions,
because some of these predicates do not take wh-clause complements:
(46) *Sally fears/hopes (for) whether Fido barks.
Many other verbs and adjectives are also limited in this way—for exam-
ple, loves, hates, despises, sorry ( for), happy (about), and surprised (by).29 We
therefore need a more general solution to Prior’s puzzle than my appeal
to concealed questions. I sketch such a solution in 5.1, relate it to con-
cealed questions in 5.2, and return to the anomaly of belief reports in
section 5.3. The result is a general solution to Prior’s puzzle and a host
of related puzzles that is independently confirmed by the concealed-
question data of section 4.
5.1. Partee’s Puzzle
The solution begins with a different puzzle, due to Partee 1974. Consider
the following argument:
(47) a. The number of insect species on Earth is increasing.
b. The number of insect species on Earth is 5.5 million.
c. Therefore, 5.5 million is increasing.
This argument is invalid. But its invalidity is hard to capture if (47a)
predicates a property—the property of increasing—of the number of
insect species on Earth, which (47b) identifies with the number 5.5
million. For then the number 5.5 million would have that property too,
as (47c) says. Although we have seen that the number of insect species on Earth
29. Although these predicates can embed some apparent wh-clauses—e.g., “Sally
feared what sharks might do”—these are free relative clauses, not interrogative clauses,
as evidenced by the fact that the wh-word can be suffixed by -ever (see note 25). This read-
ing is also supported by the fact that these verbs do not embed whether-clauses, since pred-
icates that embed interrogative clauses should be able to embed whether-clauses.
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can conceal a question rather than denoting a number, this problem can-
not be solved merely by appealing to concealed questions, because increas-
ing does not embed questions.
I take for granted a simple solution to Partee’s puzzle that com-
bines two insights.
The first insight, due to Montague (1973), is that the number of insect
species on Earth does not denote a number, but rather an individual concept.
An individual concept is a function from situations (more formally, indi-
ces of evaluation, understood as world-time pairs) to individuals. The
number of insect species on Earth denotes a function that takes a situation
and returns the number of insect species on Earth at that situation. (47a)
says that this function is increasing—that is, that its value is an increasing
function of time—not that 5.5 million is increasing. For Montague, this is
accomplished compositionally by letting number, along with many other
common nouns, denote a set of individual concepts. The number of insect
species on Earth denotes one element of that set.
But if the number of insect species on Earth denotes an individual
concept in (47a), then won’t this phrase have to be ambiguous? Won’t
it have to denote a number in (47b), on pain of identifying an individual
concept with a number?
The second insight is that no such ambiguity is required: the copu-
la in (47b) is not equative but is instead specificational (in the taxonomy of
Higgins 1973). It does not identify the denotation of the number of insect
species on Earth with the number 5.5 million. Instead, it specifies the value
of the individual concept at the relevant situation. Since (47b) does not
identify the function denoted by the number of insect species on Earth with the
number 5.5 million, the function can have properties that the number
lacks, thereby allowing (47c) to be false.
Other solutions to Partee’s puzzle, including subtle variants of this
solution, are possible. I want to assume that something like the solution I
have described is correct, but I suspect that my claims below can be modi-
fied to make sense on other solutions to the puzzle.30 I adopt the Mon-
tagovian solution for concreteness and simplicity, to provide a proof of
concept. My aim is to illustrate how we can, in principle, solve Prior’s
puzzle by assimilating it to Partee’s puzzle. What matters is that we have
30. For example, we might hold that the number of insect species on Earth denotes a
number (or other individual) but that predicates take individual concepts as their argu-
ments via a rule of intensional functional application (Heim and Kratzer 1998). I mention
how this kind of alternative could be extended to solve Prior’s puzzle in note 35.
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some way of explaining the invalidity of (47) and, crucially, that the expla-
nation accounts for the following datum: the noun phrases that give rise
to Partee’s puzzle also tend to be eligible as concealed questions (Lo¨bner
2015). Recall that the number of insect species on Earth was one of my exam-
ples of a concealed question in section 4: “The number of insect species
on Earth is astonishing” means that it is astonishing what that number is.
This datum—that the noun phrases that give rise to Partee’s
puzzle make good concealed questions—is important for the following
reason. I claimed in section 4 that proposition descriptions conceal ques-
tions in certain environments. If that is true, then we should expect them
to give rise to versions of Partee’s puzzle. And they do:
(48) a. The rumor is that Jim consumes peyote.
b. The rumor is vicious.
c. Therefore, that Jim consumes peyote is vicious.
(49) a. The evidence that vaccines cause autism is that vaccines contain
thiomersal.
b. The evidence that vaccines cause autism is scant.
c. Therefore, that vaccines contain thiomersal is scant.
These arguments are invalid. But their invalidity would seem hard to cap-
ture if (48a) and (49a) assert identities between some rumor or evidence
and the denotation of a that-clause, and if that denotation is the argument
of is vicious or is scant.31 These examples seem to me relevantly like Par-
tee’s puzzle. The resemblance seems especially striking and important
31. An anonymous reviewer suggests that these invalidities might not be hard to
capture, on the grounds that nouns like rumor are ambiguous: in one sense, rumor denotes
some rumored content; in another, it denotes the state of propagating that content. On
this view, (48) is ambiguous because the predicate in (48a) selects for the content-sense,
whereas the predicate in (48b) selects for the state-sense. But consider other nouns, such
as observation and construction, that we independently know to be ambiguous in this way: in
one sense, these expressions denote things that are observed or constructed; in another
sense, the state of observing or constructing them—hence the infelicitousness (or, at
least, zeugma) of sentences like, “The observation, which lasted an hour, was that Edward
was a vassal in Aquitaine,” and “The frequent construction is a library.” If rumor were
similarly ambiguous, we would expect sentences like, “The rumor, which is vicious, is
that Jim consumes peyote,” and “The vicious rumor is that Jim consumes peyote,” to
sound similarly bad, due to conflicting selection requirements imposed by the two pred-
icates (cf. Pryor 2007 on desire and purchase). But these sentences are perfectly acceptable.
I am therefore unconvinced that nouns like rumor are ambiguous between states and
contents. At the very least, if we can explain the invalidity of (48) and (49) without positing
such an ambiguity, that would seem preferable, other things being equal.
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given my appeal to concealed questions in section 4: if some instances of
Prior’s puzzle can indeed by solved by treating proposition descriptions as
concealed questions in certain environments, then, since question-con-
cealing expressions give rise to Partee’s puzzle, we have reason to expect
invalidities like (48) and (49) to be explained by some extension of a solu-
tion to Partee’s puzzle. And it seems reasonable to expect such an expla-
nation to deliver a solution to Prior’s puzzle.
The insight that (48) and (49) are relevantly like Partee’s puzzle is
important for two reasons: first, because it supports my claim in section 4
that proposition descriptions can serve as concealed questions, since the
constructions that give rise to Partee’s puzzle tend also to conceal ques-
tions; second, because a simple solution to Partee’s puzzle can be extend-
ed in a natural way to solve Prior’s puzzle.
The solution I have in mind appeals to simple analogues of the two
insights about (47).
First, expressions like the rumor and the evidence do not denote
rumors, evidence, or other proposition-like entities. They denote prop-
ositional concepts, on the model of individual concepts. The rumor denotes
a function that takes a situation and returns the proposition that is
rumored to be true at that situation. The evidence that p denotes a function
that takes a situation and returns the relevant proposition that provides
evidence for p at that situation. The values of these functions are prop-
ositions—for example, that Jim consumes peyote and that vaccines con-
tain thiomersal. The arguments of vicious and scant in (48b) and (49b) are
not propositions, but propositional concepts.
Second, the is of (48a) and (49a) is a specificational copula rather
than an equative one (Pryor 2007). (48a) and (49a) specify the contents
of the rumor and the evidence, rather than identifying the rumor and the
evidence with their contents. (49a) is true just in case the value of the rumor
at the present situation—that is, the proposition rumored to be true—is
that Jim consumes peyote. (49a) is true just in case the relevant value of
the evidence that vaccines cause autism at the present situation—that is, the
proposition that evidences that vaccines cause autism—is that vaccines
contain thiomersal. These assumptions yield the desired result: the rumor
and evidence can be vicious and scant without their contents being
vicious or scant, so the (c)-sentences do not follow from the (a)- and (b)-
sentences.
This story would, if correct, allow us to solve Prior’s puzzle. Just as it
is plausible that loving or fearing the number of insect species on Earth is
not loving or fearing a number, so it is plausible that loving or fearing the
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proposition that Fido barks is not loving or fearing a proposition. Such
attitudes are rather to be understood as loving or fearing some function
whose values are numbers or propositions. And one can love or fear the
function without loving or fearing its values. Thus, “Sally fears that Fido
barks” and “Sally fears the proposition that Fido barks” have different
truth conditions because the argument of fears is a proposition in the for-
mer sentence and a propositional concept in the latter.
Which function from situations to propositions does the proposition
that Fido barks denote? We can take it to denote the constant function that
returns, at each world, the proposition that Fido barks. Fears takes this
function and returns a predicate that is true of an individual just in case
she fears the proposition that Fido barks. By contrast, when fears is fed the
proposition that Fido barks—rather than the constant function with this
proposition as its value—it returns a predicate that is true of an individual
just in case she fears that Fido barks. One and the same verb ( fears) takes
different arguments (propositions and propositional concepts), thereby
returning different values. Of course, I have not explained why this verb
should return such different values for constant propositional concepts.
But we have no more reason to expect it to return the same values than
we have to expect it to return different values. Fears is far from alone in
this behavior. The pattern seems to hold for most verbs that embed
both that-clauses and proposition descriptions, including (for variety,
not completeness) see, hear, feel, expect, desire, notice, show, recognize, discover,
overlook, imagine, remember, forget, sense, teach, conclude, suspect, resolve, sing,
read, announce, report, mention, suggest, promise, threaten, cheer, like, hate, and
many others. What cries out for explanation is not that these verbs return
different values for propositions and propositional concepts, but rather
that believes (among a handful of other verbs) does not. I return to this
question in section 5.3.
I said that the proposition that Fido barks denotes a constant prop-
ositional concept. But I do not want to assume that all propositional
concepts are constant functions. For example, the evidence that Fido barks
would seem to return a different proposition at different situations,
depending on which proposition evidences that Fido barks at that situ-
ation. The rumor that Fido barks might denote a propositional concept that
returns the proposition that Fido barks at all situations where that prop-
osition is rumored to be true, and no proposition otherwise.
This solution to Prior’s puzzle applies to all predicates of propo-
sitional attitude, not just ones that embed questions. Proposition descrip-
tions univocally denote propositional concepts, not propositions.
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This view might seem somewhat paradoxical. For it might seem to
predict that the following sentence should be false:32
(50) The proposition that Fido barks is a proposition.
For if the proposition that Fido barks does not denote a proposition, then how
could (50) be true?
The first thing to note is that a parallel problem would seem to
arise for any simple Montagovian solution to Partee’s puzzle. If the number
of insect species on Earth denotes an individual concept, not a number, then
we might expect the following sentence to be false:
(51) The number of insect species on Earth is a number.
But remember (from our discussion of (47)) that, for Montague, the num-
ber of insect species on Earth gets its individual-concept denotation compo-
sitionally: number denotes a set of individual concepts, and the definite
description denotes a particular member of that set. (51) is true because
the individual concept denoted by the number of insect species on Earth is
indeed a member of the set of individual concepts denoted by number.
This suggests an analogous account of (50). On my extension of
the Montagovian story, proposition—along with other content nouns like
evidence, rumor, and so on—always denotes a set of propositional con-
cepts. The proposition that Fido barks denotes a particular member of that
set. That is why (50) is true, even though the proposition that Fido barks does
not denote a proposition.
This account suggests a simple solution to a variant of Prior’s
puzzle involving indefinite descriptions:
(52) a. Kim fears that nuclear war is imminent.
b. Kim fears a proposition.
(52a) does not entail (52b). This might seem hard to explain on the view
that that-clauses denote propositions.
My appeal to propositional concepts, however, suggests a simple
solution to this variant of Prior’s puzzle. In (52b), proposition denotes a set
of propositional concepts. The sentence is true just in case Kim fears
some member of that set. Kim might fear that nuclear war is imminent
without fearing any propositional concept. That is why (52a) does not
entail (52b).
32. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising the issues discussed in the
remainder of this subsection.
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What about variants involving names? Consider:
(53) a. Go¨del feared that arithmetic reduces to logic.
b. Go¨del feared logicism.
Again, (53a) seems not to entail (53b).
This kind of example is not addressed by anything we have seen so
far. But I suggest that, on my extension of the Montagovian picture, logi-
cism—along with other -isms—should also denote a propositional con-
cept: it should denote the same constant propositional concept as the
proposition that arithmetic reduces to logic. This suggestion seems to me plau-
sible, given the naturalness of speeches like
(54) Logicism is (identical to) the proposition/claim/doctrine that arith-
metic reduces to logic,
compared to the relative unnaturalness of speeches like
(55) ?Logicism is (*identical to) that arithmetic reduces to logic.
I do not insist that all -isms denote constant propositional concepts. Per-
haps some denote variable propositional concepts, whose values change
between worlds or over time. For example, some might take Trotskyism to
denote a doctrine whose content at a world and time depends, at least in
part, on the views attributed to Leon Trotsky at that world and time.
The suggestion that logicism denotes a propositional concept may
seem ad hoc, on the grounds that ordinary proper names denote indi-
viduals. But, in fact, there is precedent for claiming that names denote
individual concepts—constant ones, if names are rigid designators.
Abbott (2010; 2011), for example, argues that such a strategy is helpful
in solving the problem of empty names and in drawing the distinction
between “specific” and “nonspecific” indefinites.33 Although I do not
insist that ordinary proper names denote individual concepts, it seems
to me reasonable to allow -isms to denote propositional concepts, given
the Montagovian picture in the background. At the very least, I lack any
strong pretheoretical inclination to think that such expressions must
denote propositions rather than nearby entities.
I have suggested that proposition descriptions denote proposi-
tional concepts, not propositions. This allows us to solve Prior’s puzzle
33. See also Janssen 1984 on Geach’s (1980) “herald names,” Aloni 2005 on attitude
reports, and Elbourne 2009 on demonstratives. Another interesting function of individ-
ual concepts, in the theory of arbitrary objects, is suggested by Kripke (1992).
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as well as its variants involving indefinites and names. But this proposal
invites the following questions. First, how does this solution to Prior’s puz-
zle fit with my appeal to concealed questions in section 4? And, second, if
we accept this solution, then how could we possibly explain why Prior’s
puzzle does not arise for believes? I answer these questions below.
5.2. Concealed Questions Revisited
In section 4, I suggested that proposition descriptions sometimes serve as
concealed questions, and that this accounts for some instances of Prior’s
puzzle. But if the solution to other instances of Prior’s puzzle is something
entirely different—an appeal to propositional concepts—then we seem
to have a highly disunified account of a seemingly unified phenomenon.
However, my hypothesis that proposition descriptions denote prop-
ositional concepts and my claim that they sometimes serve as concealed
questions are mutually reinforcing. For, as I have already mentioned,
the noun phrases that give rise to Partee’s puzzle also tend to make good
concealed questions. This has led many people to seek an account of con-
cealed questions in terms of individual concepts. Some suggest that con-
cealed questions denote individual concepts (Heim 1979; Romero 2005;
Frana 2010). Others suggest that concealed question readings might arise
because, in certain environments, individual concepts get type-shifted into
question meanings (Barker 2016). We need not choose between these
different views here. The point is that on any plausible account of con-
cealed questions we should expect a systematic connection between
concealed questions and the noun phrases that denote individual (or
propositional) concepts and give rise to Partee’s puzzle.
For example, it is natural to think that concealed questions denote
whatever interrogative clauses denote. And what do such clauses denote?
On one view, they denote question intensions. A question intension is a
function that takes a situation and returns the proposition that truly and
exhaustively answers the question in that situation (Groenendijk and
Stokhof 1982; Aloni and Roelofsen 2012). On this view, what caused
World War I denotes a function that, when applied to our actual situation,
returns the proposition that the assassination of Ferdinand caused World
War I. The cause of World War I denotes this same function when it serves
as a concealed question. And question intensions just are propositional
concepts: they are functions from situations to propositions. Thus, if
proposition descriptions denote propositional concepts, then we should
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expect them to serve as concealed questions when they complement
question-taking verbs—which they do, if my suggestion in section 4 is
correct.
So my solution to Prior’s puzzle is quite unified. “Sally fears the
proposition that Fido barks” and “Sally fears that Fido barks” have differ-
ent truth conditions because the proposition that Fido barks denotes a prop-
ositional concept, not a proposition. If propositional concepts are also
the meanings of concealed questions, then we would expect the proposition
that Fido barks to conceal a question when it complements explains and
other question-taking verbs—which is just what I suggested in section 4.
Thus, the data of section 4 provides independent confirmation of my
solution to Prior’s puzzle. Even if propositional concepts are not the
meanings of concealed questions, there must be some other systematic
connection between the noun phrases that give rise to Partee’s puzzle and
concealed questions. Since proposition descriptions give rise to Partee’s
puzzle, we can expect them to conceal questions and thus to denote
things other than propositions—thereby solving Prior’s puzzle in a way
that allows that-clauses to denote propositions.
This solution to Prior’s puzzle, however, would seem to generate a
new Rundle-like puzzle.34 For if fears, hopes ( for), and the like sometimes
take propositional concepts as their objects, and if propositional con-
cepts are the meanings of concealed questions, then we might expect
these verbs to embed concealed questions. But they do not embed con-
cealed questions, because they do not embed any questions.
A fully satisfactory response to this Rundle-like puzzle would
require an answer to the following, more general question: why do some
proposition-embedding predicates, but not others, embed questions?
The simplest answer I know of is what Egre´ (2008) calls the factivity hypoth-
esis (attributed to Hintikka 1975). According to the factivity hypothesis, a
verb takes both declarative and interrogative complements only if it is
factive, in the sense of presupposing its declarative complement. Here is
an intuitive (and highly oversimplified) way of motivating this hypothesis.
Question-embedding verbs seem to come in two kinds. Some, such
as wonders, express what Friedman (2013) calls question-directed attitudes:
attitudes toward questions themselves, not toward any particular answers
to these questions. Verbs that express question-directed attitudes cannot
34. I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
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take that-clause complements:
(56) a. Sally wonders whether Fido barks.
b. *Sally wonders that Fido barks.
Other question-embedding verbs, such as knows, express what we might
call answer-directed attitudes—in particular, attitudes directed toward true
answers. When fed a propositional concept, knows (for example) returns
a predicate that is true of an agent just in case she knows the actual value
of that concept. What is distinctive about verbs that express answer-
directed attitudes is that (plausibly, though controversially) for any verb
F that expresses such an attitude, and any question q? whose true answer is
that p, one Fs q? only if one Fs that p. For example, if Fido barks, then (57a)
below entails (57b).
(57) a. Sally knows whether Fido barks.
b. Sally knows that Fido barks.
If the only question-embedding verbs are those that express question-
directed attitudes and those that express answer-directed attitudes, so
understood, then we can obtain the factivity hypothesis. For a nonfactive
proposition-embedding verb cannot express a question-directed attitude
(because it embeds propositions) or an answer-directed attitude (because
such attitudes are essentially directed toward true answers).
On this simple picture, it is easy to explain why fears and hopes ( for)
do not embed concealed questions, despite taking propositional con-
cepts as their objects. They do not embed concealed questions because
they do not embed questions. They do not embed questions because they
embed propositions (unlike wonders) yet are not factive (unlike knows).
But they can take propositional concepts as their objects because they take
arbitrary noun-phrase complements, some of which denote proposi-
tional concepts. It is possible, although very strange, to have an attitude
toward a propositional concept that is neither question- nor answer-
directed. Fear and hope are examples of such attitudes. Propositional
concepts, when strangely ascribed as the objects of such attitudes, do not
conceal questions.
Of course, this account raises at least two further questions: first,
why verbs like fears and hopes ( for) are not factive; and, second, whether
and why the factivity hypothesis is correct. I do not know the answers to
these questions. But they are questions for everyone. Their importance
and difficulty are independent of my solution to Prior’s puzzle. The point
is merely that, given a general story about which proposition-embedding
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predicates can embed questions and why—a story that we need regard-
less of how we solve Prior’s puzzle—we can explain why fears and hopes
( for) do not embed concealed questions despite sometimes expressing
attitudes to propositional concepts.
5.3. Belief Reports Revisited
The sentences below have the same truth conditions:
(58) a. Sally believes that Fido barks.
b. Sally believes the proposition that Fido barks.
How can this be explained on the hypothesis that the proposition that Fido
barks denotes a propositional concept, not a proposition?
It would be ad hoc to claim that proposition descriptions are ambig-
uous, denoting propositions in belief reports and propositional concepts
in reports of other attitudes. Fortunately, I do not think that such an
ambiguity is required. Believes is peculiar in a way that can help explain
why (58a) and (58b) mean the same thing.
The peculiar feature is that belief reports always seem to express
relations between agents and propositions, even when the object of
believes seems to denote a nonpropositional entity. Consider (59):
(59) a. I believe my mother.
b. I fear/love/hate my mother.
I doubt that (59b) expresses a relation between the speaker and a prop-
osition. But a token utterance of (59a) is true just in case the speaker
believes some contextually relevant proposition associated with her
mother. Supposing, for example, that Sally’s mother says that Fido barks,
then a token utterance of (59a) by Sally may be true just in case (58a) is
true. Nonetheless, my mother does not denote a proposition.
How can this help us explain why (58a) and (58b) mean the same
thing? It depends on how our semantics of believes accommodates sen-
tences like (59a). One possibility is that believes is polysemous. In one sense,
it takes a proposition and returns a predicate that is true of an individual
(e.g., Sally) just in case Sally believes that proposition. In another sense, it
takes a nonpropositional entity (e.g., my mother) and returns a predicate
that is true of Sally just in case Sally believes some contextually salient
proposition associated with the entity—for example, that Fido barks (if
Sally’s mother says so). This polysemy would explain the strangeness (to
my ear, at least) of sentences like, “I believe my mother and that Fido
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barks.” I do not insist on this particular route. I claim only that we need
some way to account for (59a) that does not assign my mother a proposition
as its denotation: Sally’s mother is a very nice person, not a proposition.
(And even if my mother is ambiguous in this ad hoc way, it would seem no
more or less ad hoc to claim that proposition descriptions denote prop-
ositions in belief reports but not elsewhere.)
Suppose we have such an account of believes as it occurs in sen-
tences like (59a)—that is, some account of why, for some contextually
salient proposition p associated with the speaker’s mother, a token utter-
ance of (59a) is true just in case the speaker believes that p. And suppose
the account does not require an occurrence of my mother to denote that p.
Then we should not find it surprising for (58b)—“Sally believes the
proposition that Fido barks”—to be true just in case Sally believes that
Fido barks, even though the proposition that Fido barks does not denote that
Fido barks. Consider, for example, the polysemy hypothesis I mentioned
in the previous paragraph. We might think that, in (58b), believes takes a
nonpropositional entity—the propositional concept denoted by the prop-
osition that Fido barks—and returns a predicate that is true of Sally just in
case she believes the contextually salient proposition associated with the
entity: namely, that Fido barks. By contrast, in (58a)—“Sally believes that
Fido barks”—believes simply takes a proposition—namely, that Fido
barks—and returns a predicate that is true of Sally just in case she believes
that Fido barks. This story could, if correct, explain why (58b) and (58a)
have the same truth conditions even though the proposition that Fido barks
and that Fido barks denote different things: the two senses of believes take
different arguments but are systematically related in such a way that they
return the same values in the cases at hand. Again, I do not insist that
believes is polysemous. I claim only that we need some account of the pecu-
liar behavior of believes in sentences like (59a), and that such an account
seems likely to explain why (58b) and (58a) have the same truth con-
ditions despite the proposition that Fido barks denoting a propositional
concept.
The problem involving belief reports arose on my view because I
said that proposition descriptions univocally denote propositional con-
cepts. I was trying to avoid multiplying senses beyond necessity. But even if
we are not sure whether proposition descriptions univocally denote prop-
ositional concepts, we can pass the buck of answering this question to the
theory of individual concepts—or, more generally, to whatever our best
solution to Partee’s puzzle is. For recall that an analogous question arose
in that context. If the number of insect species on Earth denotes an individual
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concept in, “The number of insect species on Earth is increasing,” then—
we asked—wouldn’t it have to be ambiguous between individual concept-
denoting and individual- (namely, number-) denoting senses? I said no.
But if the answer is yes—if the number of insect species on Earth sometimes
denotes a number, not an individual concept—then we need some prin-
cipled account of when it denotes a number and when it does not. We
might expect such an account to explain why, similarly, proposition
descriptions sometimes seem to denote propositions—as in (58b)—
and sometimes not—as in (48b) and (49b). And those who think that
proposition descriptions univocally denote propositions would likely also
think the number of insect species on Earth univocally denotes a number, and
thus need some other solution to Partee’s puzzle. My hope is that, how-
ever we solve Partee’s puzzle and its analogues for proposition descrip-
tions—for example, (48) and (49)—we can use that solution to solve
Prior’s puzzle.
5.4. Summary
I have suggested that proposition descriptions do not denote prop-
ositions and thus need not be intersubstitutable salve veritate with that-
clauses. This allows us to maintain that that-clauses denote propositions
without appealing to a widespread ambiguity in predicates of proposi-
tional attitude.
Some might find my proposal to have a somewhat absurd flavor:
how could the proposition that p denote anything other than the prop-
osition that p? It seems that the proposition that p should denote the prop-
osition that p if anything does. My proposal, however, is no more absurd
than the influential (although, of course, controversial) solution to Par-
tee’s puzzle, which I took for granted in section 5.1, according to which the
number of insect species on Earth does not denote a number. Anyone sym-
pathetic to that solution should be wary of dismissing my response to
Prior’s puzzle out of hand. Anyone unsympathetic to that solution needs
some other response to Partee’s puzzle, which can be extended to solve
Prior’s puzzle in a way analogous to the strategy I have suggested.35
35. For example, the view mentioned in note 30 would yield the following solution:
although the proposition that p officially denotes the proposition that p, the argument of
fears in “Sally fears the proposition that Fido barks” is not the proposition that Fido barks
but rather the intension of that proposition—that is, a propositional concept. By contrast,
in “Sally fears that Fido barks,” we can take that Fido barks to denote a truth value, whose
intension (and thus the argument of fears) is a proposition. This view would allow us to
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6. Conclusion
My strategy in this article has been to draw connections between various
puzzles about proposition descriptions and propositional attitude reports.
We began with an analogue of Rundle’s puzzle involving adjectives. A
natural solution to that analogous puzzle allowed us to reduce Rundle’s
puzzle to Prior’s puzzle. But this spelled trouble for King’s solution to
Prior’s puzzle, because the ambiguity in propositional attitude verbs
would spread implausibly to other expressions. So we sought another
solution to Prior’s puzzle—one that could also solve Ku¨nne’s puzzle and
explain why Prior’s puzzle does not arise for believes. I suggested that
Ku¨nne’s puzzle, despite appearances, should not be solved along the
lines of Rundle’s puzzle, but rather by appealing to concealed questions,
which cannot be embedded by believes. And we have independent reason
to think that proposition descriptions serve as concealed questions, since
they give rise to instances of Partee’s puzzle—a solution to which can be
naturally extended to solve Prior’s puzzle in a more general way. If I am
right, then we can solve Prior’s puzzle without rejecting the standard view
of propositional attitude reports or multiplying senses beyond necessity.
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